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Dark nudges in gambling 
‘Nudge’ has come into common usage in behavioral science, the intersection of 
psychology and economics, for situations where a ‘choice architect’ aligns a system 
with consumers’ best long-term interests (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A cafeteria 
designer might ‘nudge’ her customers by placing the salad bar centrally, while 
relegating unhealthier foods to a corner. In this editorial I argue that, in gambling, 
nudging works differently. Gambling’s ‘dark nudges’ are designed to exploit gamblers’ 
biases, as economic rationality on the part of gambling firms predicts. Gambling’s dark 
nudges reveal the contradictions of industry-led responsible gambling initiatives, and 
show how stronger regulation is required to reverse gambling’s spiralling public health 
costs (Korn & Shaffer, 1999; Livingstone & Adams, 2011; Markham & Young, 2015; 
Orford, 2005; Orford, 2010). 
Figures show that many countries have a large gambling problem (The 
Economist, 2017). Australia, for example, leads the way with annual losses of $990 per-
resident adult in 2016, while the United States had the fifth highest per-resident adult 
losses of over $450 in 2016, corresponding to the highest overall per-country loss of 
$116.9 billion. Gambling losses – the gambling industry’s profits – have increased as 
jurisdictions compete to deregulate gambling and gain a short-term economic boost, 
while hoping the costs will mostly fall on their neighbours (Atkinson, Nichols, & 
Oleson, 2000; Grinols, 2004). The result is record worldwide gambling losses, which 
are forecast to continue rising (The Economist, 2017). This is generally puzzling, as 
competition between gambling firms should benefit consumers, as is assumed in the 
standard economic model (Akerlof & Shiller, 2015; Bar-Gill, 2012). Recent theoretical 
analysis by Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Murooka (2016b), however, reveals how market 
competition can instead produce consumer exploitation in “socially-wasteful” products. 
Gambling is socially-wasteful: gamblers’ losses are transferred to gambling 
firms and professional gamblers, with gamblers, their families, and society suffering the 
social costs.  This simple fact radically alters the standard economic model (Heidhues, 
Kőszegi, & Murooka, 2016b). Consider a completely truthful new gambling firm, 
whose marketing campaigns educate potential gamblers about these facts. This firm 
creates aware and informed consumers, who therefore refuse to gamble there or 
elsewhere on unfair terms (since gambling is socially wasteful). Of course this noble 
firm makes no profit, which can explain why no profit-maximizing gambling firm acts 
in this way! Instead, a profit-maximizing firm should exploit the same biases as 
incumbents, and even innovate new exploitative products (Heidhues, Kőszegi, & 
Murooka, 2016a). 
Modern electronic gambling machines are a good example of dark nudging in 
practice (Schüll, 2012). Previous mechanical gambling machines were slow and simple. 
The gambler entered some money, pulled a lever, and waited for their feedback on one 
of only a few potential outcomes. Electronic machines, in contrast, optimize each step 
of the gambler’s experience. Large denominations of money, or token equivalents, are 
inserted for a continuous gambling experience. Touchscreen buttons minimize the 
physical effort of long gambling sessions. Additionally, in modern machines the number 
of gambling options has increased, while outcome feedback is considerably harder to 
interpret than ever before. Mechanical machines had two designed outcomes: win, and 
lose. A third psychologically-meaningful “near-miss” outcome was created by chance. 
A “near-miss”, of say apple-apple-pear, was found to reinforce gamblers despite no 
payout (Reid, 1986). Nowadays, near-miss frequencies are optimized with industrial 
precision (Parke & Griffiths, 2004). Many modern gambling machines utilize “losses-
disguised-as-wins”, where the gambler loses money overall, but nevertheless receives 
simultaneously-delivered audio and visual positive reinforcement indicative of a partial 
“win” (Dixon, Harrigan, Sandhu, Collins, & Fugelsang, 2010). An increasing number of 
potential gambling strategies, linked to meaningless bells, whistles, and associations, 
are deployed to motivate gamblers to search for illusory winning patterns (Langer, 
1975). Over time the machines have only become ever more exploitative – as socially-
wasteful products tend to – when unchecked by government regulation. 
Electronic gambling machines are a key driver of gambling’s public health costs 
and an absolute priority for gambling research (Livingstone & Adams, 2011; Markham 
& Young, 2015). From October 2015 to September 2016 British gamblers lost £1.8 
billion on electronic gambling machines (Gambling Commission, 2017). But 
exploitative innovation never sleeps. “Remote” online and mobile gambling now brings 
electronic gambling machine’s same exploitative features into the home and on the go. 
British gamblers lost £4.5 billion on remote gambling over that same time period 
(Gambling Commission, 2017).  Remote gambling overcomes physical limitations on 
gambling harm, just like the move from mechanical to electronic gambling machines.  
Remote gambling means that sports bets can be made at a higher-frequency now 
than ever before (Lopez-Gonzalez, Estévez, & Griffiths, 2017), with gambling 
frequency being a risk factor in problem gambling (Griffiths, 1999). Gambles are 
available on many sports and competitions from all over the world. “In-play” gambling 
further increases gambling frequency, encouraging repeat gambling as a sporting event 
unfolds with betting odds updating in real time (Killick & Griffiths, 2018). And while, 
for example, in soccer only a few possible gambles could previously be made per-match 
(Forrest & Simmons, 2001), now gambles can be made on almost any imaginable 
combination of events. Advertising patterns from British bookmakers show how it is 
possible to engineer gambles which are both psychologically-alluring and which can 
increase the bookmaker’s profit margin by a factor of six – from 5.7% to 34.6% or 
higher (Newall, 2017). Here I will use an example advert from the 2014 soccer World 
Cup, although the key psychological factors are used more broadly: ‘Thomas Müller to 
score first and Germany to win 3-1’ (Newall, 2015). 
This bet can be advertised to consumers with a high potential win, if the match 
unfolds exactly as specified. However, the size of that win is less than it ‘should’ be, as 
the bookmaker profit margin increases as more events are chained together to create the 
bet (Ayton, 1997; Newall, 2015). This increase in the bookmaker profit margin goes 
unnoticed, since soccer fans share a broader human tendency to overestimate the 
probabilities of highly specific events, compared to more inclusive probabilities, such as 
‘Germany to win’ (Newall, 2017; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). The above bet exploits 
another bias in probabilistic forecasting, known as ‘representativeness’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). Thomas Müller was the highest goalscorer in both the 2010 and 2014 
World Cups, while Germany also won the 2014 World Cup. Therefore, the above bet 
feels likely to happen, even though it is still very unlikely to happen exactly as 
specified. It’s more likely that the highly specific event ‘nearly’ happens, for example 
with Germany winning 3-0 or 3-2 – another example of the exploitative ‘near-miss’ 
effect. This results in the creation of a profitable ‘longshot’ bet for the bookmaker 
(Buhagiar, Cortis, & Newall, 2018; Constantinou & Fenton, 2013), but a longshot 
which feels more likely to happen than a ‘classical’ longshot, e.g. betting on ‘San 
Marino to win’ (currently ranked 204th in the world). This example is a dark counterpart 
of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) benevolent cafeteria designer, where the choice 
architecture instead aims to magnify gamblers’ biases.   
Gambling regulators may hope that exploitative industry incumbents will 
eventually get displaced as more consumer-friendly firms enter the market. But dark 
nudges need not follow from evil design. In online environments, firms can 
experimentally test many different marketing messages, and see what consumers 
respond to (Kohavi & Longbotham, 2017). And because gambling is socially-wasteful, 
new firms cannot gain a profitable foothold by being truthful (Heidhues et al., 2016b). 
In fact the opposite can even occur, where consumer-friendly firms adapt their business 
models to become more exploitative. PokerStars and Betfair are two innovators of the 
early 2000s online gambling boom, which were based on consumer-friendly models, 
allowing “smart” gamblers to win in direct competition against other gamblers. But both 
companies are perceived by their smart professional gamblers to be moving to reduce 
the skill element of their offerings, ensuring the house now wins against everyone. 
A fully-informed consumer, who understands the odds of winning, lies at the 
heart of “responsible gambling” initiatives (Blaszczynski et al., 2011). An economist, 
seeing a gambler using a high-risk product, might conclude that this action maximizes 
the gambler’s happiness. But this ignores how the gambler’s behavior is as much driven 
by their immediate context (Reith & Dobbie, 2013), by dark nudges, than by rational 
reflection. Warning messages have often been added to dangerous gambling products 
(Ginley, Whelan, Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017), but warning messages do not help 
when the underlying gambles are complex and difficult to understand (Weiss-Cohen, 
Konstantinidis, Speekenbrink, & Harvey, 2018).  While the gambling industry claims to 
support responsible gambling (Miller, Thomas, Smith, & Robinson, 2016), the action of 
these same firms’ dark nudges speak louder than words. And responsible gambling 
messages only increase gamblers’ perceived stigma (Miller & Thomas, 2017); a cruel 
irony given how the system is designed to exploit them. 
What should happen next? The modern gambling environment could be likened 
to a poker game played between gamblers, gambling firms, regulators, and researchers. 
While these players each get dealt from the same deck of cards, a poker player’s long-
term results will depend on what she knows about the other players, and the size of her 
bankroll. Gambling firms possess detailed customer datasets for marketing optimization 
(Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 2017), large public relations budgets (Petticrew et 
al., 2017), and oftentimes direct control of research funding (Cassidy, Loussouarn, & 
Pisac, 2013; Livingstone & Adams, 2016). Any expert poker player would exploit such 
a list of advantages (Newall, 2011; Newall, 2013). Researchers, meanwhile, must do 
their best with what funding they have, and without access to gambling firms’ 
proprietary data. The end result is an unreasonably large transfer of wealth from 
gamblers to the gambling industry. Gamblers are not helped by some governmental 
actors who hesitate over gambling restrictions because of short-run revenue losses 
(Mairs, 2018), despite the large costs of gambling to society (Coren Mitchell, 2017). 
Gamblers deserve a fairer game. 
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